Not as easy as it looks: regulating effective corporate governance by Jerry L. Jordan
n  The CEO 
One fairly common practice that’s 
currently being scrutinized carefully is
allowing the chairman of the board of
directors to be the company’s chief exec-
utive officer as well. Some argue that one
person should not be given this dual role.
The board of directors’job is to oversee
the company’s management team on
behalf of the owners of the company, the
shareholders. The CEO leads the com-
pany’s management team, and the chair-
man leads the group that is supposed to
oversee the management team. Allowing
one person to be both CEO and chairman
seems like a surefire conflict of interest,
bound to prevent objective decision mak-
ing and interfere with appropriate checks
and balances. But wait, what about com-
panies like Microsoft, which would not
be the company it is today if Bill Gates
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Accounting scandals, executive mis-
conduct, and poor management at
once-prosperous corporations have
shaken investor confidence in corpo-
rate integrity, and worse, in the mech-
anisms that are supposed to ensure
good corporate management. What
will it take to restore confidence? This
Commentary suggests that the markets
will respond with innovations and
adjustments that lead to better man-
agement, accounting, and disclosure.
Greater government policing has an
important, but limited, role to play.
This Commentary was adapted from
talking points and notes prepared for
various seminars and workshops
related to financial system reforms.
Recent calamities in the financial
markets—from the collapse of Enron
and Global Crossings to the problems at
Kmart—have weakened the integrity of
the financial markets and led people to
wonder how things got so out of hand
and how investor confidence can be
restored. How do we ensure that compa-
nies are well run and honest? Many 
market observers are calling for greater
government policing of companies, but
will that help? 
We should be very careful about what
we impose on the market by edict.
Absolute principles of good corporate
management are hard to specify, and try-
ing to regulate companies’management
approaches too heavily can backfire.
When government interference in mar-
kets goes wrong, which it often does, its
worst effect is to impede the natural
innovation of the marketplace. The mar-
kets’natural innovation improves almost
everything—from products and prices 
to accounting practices and corporate
management practices.
This Commentary discusses some press-
ing questions of corporate governance
and reflects on how the marketplace is
evolving to address those questions. And
evolve it has—perhaps most attention has
been focused on legislative solutions—
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—but markets
have reacted in their own way—from 
the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE)
new corporate governance listing stan-
dards to changes in accounting at firms
such as Coca-Cola. 
n  Roles and Duties
Effective corporate governance requires
what companies sometimes have a hard
time remembering: Everyone involved
in governing the company must be
assigned a carefully chosen role and,
perhaps more importantly, they must 
be provided with what they need to fill
that role. Three provisions are essential:
responsibility, authority, and account-
ability. People must be assigned explicit
responsibility for the duties associated
with their roles, authorized to carry out
the actions necessary for their roles, and
held accountable for the actions they
take. The absence of any of these ele-
ments compromises anyone’s ability to
successfully serve his or her role. It is
unfair to assign responsibility to an 
individual, not provide him with the
authority to take action, and yet hold 
him accountable when the responsibility
is not fulfilled. Likewise, to give some-
one both responsibility and authority
without holding him accountable for his
actions is signing a blank check—and
that’s not fair to the stakeholders. And
certainly providing authority for a task 
is futile if no one is responsible for it. 
Much of the recent talk about improving
corporate governance has centered on
the need for establishing proper controls
and ensuring separation of duties. These
suggestions are ultimately about getting
the three essentials just named in place,
for they concern the roles of various
entities in the governance structure, what
they are responsible for, and who they
are accountable to. Frequently heard
questions lately—Who is the CEO
accountable to? What is her authority?
What auditing structure best holds 
management accountable?—are all
about getting responsibility, authority,
and accountability right.weren’t both chairman and chief execu-
tive officer? In fact, many entrepreneur-
ial and innovative companies thrive
largely because one person is both chair-
man and chief executive officer. 
So the one-size-fits-all manner of 
determining the appropriate structure
and relationship between the chairman
and CEO won’t work. Mandating a split
may be counterproductive, but a market
solution—where directors decide when 
a split is appropriate for their firm—may
work better.
Another practice that’s come under fire
is allowing the CEO too much influence
in appointing members to the board of
directors. CEOs often participate in the
search for new directors—and for good
reason: The CEO is likely the person
who can best describe the company’s
business, enabling candidates to make
informed decisions about their interest 
in being on the board. However, when it
comes to selecting the slate of candi-
dates submitted for shareholder vote,
most people believe the CEO should
have no voice. Candidates should
instead be determined by an objective
group or committee of outside directors,
so that newly appointed directors (and
often, long-standing ones) will not feel
obligated to the CEO as the person who
brought them in to the organization.
It is really up to the board of directors 
to ensure that the CEO stays out of the
nominating process. The directors are
agents of the owners of the corpora-
tion—the shareholders—not the CEO,
and they are expected to act in the
shareholders’best interest. To serve the
shareholders well, the directors must
provide objective oversight of the cor-
poration’s management team, and to 
do that they must maintain the board’s
independence from the management
team. Indeed, the NYSE reforms have
recognized the importance of this inde-
pendence and mandated that companies
listed on the exchange must have a
nominating committee composed solely
of outside directors.
n  The Audit Function
The board of directors’audit committee
is another function that analysts say
should exclude company executives. 
The audit committee ensures the effec-
tiveness of audits performed on the 
company. The job is critical because the
directors cannot oversee the corporation
effectively without reliable audits. Of
course, the audit committee should 
consist of directors who are adequately
informed and knowledgeable about the
activities of the company, but they
should not be company employees. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act goes even further,
mandating that all audit committee
members be independent directors.
The Enron–Andersen scandal drove
home the need to separate a company’s
external auditors from its business con-
sultants. And while various activities can
be considered either or both—such as
tax consulting—separating these particu-
lar service providers is clearly required 
if a company wants to achieve an inde-
pendent audit function. But what about
the relationship between the external and
internal auditors? Must these auditors be
from different firms? It may be more
efficient for the same firm to do both, but
it may also make getting an independent,
objective external audit more difficult.
The external audit builds on the results of
the internal audit, and the first step of the
external audit is to validate those results.
Since one auditing firm can supposedly
validate the results of its own internal
audit more easily than a new auditor can,
it should speed the validation process.
However, some business analysts ques-
tion whether a single firm can assess its
own work as objectively as another
could. Without an objective assessment
of the internal audit, the quality of the
external audit will suffer. Certainly, the
current competitive environment makes
finding and exploiting efficiencies more
important than ever. But if these effi-
ciencies are achieved at the expense of
objectivity, independent oversight loses
its value. That seems to be how the
NYSE viewed the matter, as its new
guidelines forbid the same firm to do
both internal and external audit.
n  Accounting 
Recent business scandals in the United
States have led to calls for an oversight
board or committee that would establish
and enforce minimum operating stan-
dards for auditing firms. Some countries
already have something similar. For
example, the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland have empowered 
the Auditing Practices Board to set audit-
ing standards there. The International
Federation of Accountants, a professional
organization representing 114 countries’
national accounting organizations, issues
recommendations on good auditing prac-
tices as well as standards intended to
make some auditing practices uniform
across all countries. In the United States,
a new agency has been formed, the Pub-
lic Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB).
Required standards are a step in the right
direction, but they won’t work if they’re
not enforced. Creating an oversight
board won’t work either if care isn’t
taken to ensure that its members are 
adequately independent of a country’s
auditing firms. This may make the
appointment process somewhat delicate
and at times controversial (as it has been
in the United States) because it’s difficult
to find someone knowledgeable enough
to police the accounting firms without
being beholden to them. It is also impor-
tant to ensure that funding for the board’s
activities doesn’t depend on the good
will of the accounting firms them-
selves—and, indeed, the PCAOB fund-
ing will come not from assessments on
accounting firms (as did the Financial
Accounting Standards Board’s), but from
corporate clients of the accounting firms.
The ultimate goal of an effectively func-
tioning audit environment—both glob-
ally and for individual corporations—
is to assure that adequate information is
disclosed in a timely enough manner for
stakeholders to accurately assess the
condition of a company. Without this
adequate and timely disclosure, potential
investors, suppliers, and customers do
not have the proper information upon
which to base their decisions about inter-
acting with the company—buying its
stock, selling it goods on credit, or
depending on its products. 
Financial markets around the world have
become increasingly interconnected,
and, as a result, concern over appropriate
standards for disclosing this information
has grown. Two main sets of standards
have become favored in different coun-
tries, international accounting standards
and generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. Both standards have their merits
and, depending upon the circumstances,
one standard may be more useful than
the other. Certainly, neither standard, if
adopted globally, would meet the needs
of all users. So lately the benefits of “har-
monizing” both standards to create a
new, global standard is often discussed.
This best-of-both-worlds theory has
some appeal—until one recognizes the
accompanying ramifications of such an
effort. Achieving a global set of stan-
dards and convincing enough countries
to adopt it would require creating a
worldwide board to establish the standards, administer the rules, deliber-
ate on instances of noncompliance, and
determine enforcement actions—an
undertaking easily likened to creating
the United Nations. And while this cer-
tainly can be done (we do, obviously,
have a United Nations), such harmoniza-
tion may not be worth the effort or even
wholly beneficial. Forging a uniform
standard that would work across many
different countries may require compro-
mises that render it ineffective. 
Another downside of a single worldwide
standard might be that it stifles the 
continued experimentation, innovation,
and adaptation of standards to best meet
the needs of evolving financial markets.
Opponents of a single standard ask
whether we aren’t focusing on changing
the wrong variable, much like the secu-
rity guards who observed a man, night
after night, carting away wheelbarrows
full of dirt from a construction site and
were bewildered, until it occurred to
them he wasn’t stealing the dirt, but the
wheelbarrows. Perhaps we should not
worry about changing accounting 
standards, but rather global financial
markets and exchanges. Some finance
analysts have suggested that dual or
multistandard systems of accounting
principles should be recognized and
accepted in all financial markets and
exchanges. Such plurality might pro-
mote a healthy competition among the
respective governance boards and
encourage wider adoption of improve-
ments and advancements in principles
when they emerged, which would bene-
fit market participants. Clearly, high-
quality international accounting stan-
dards—whether the result of one system
or multiple systems—improve investor
confidence, enhance market liquidity,
and may ultimately reduce the cost 
of capital.
n  What Information Should
Companies Provide?
Multiple standards of accounting 
principles are likely to lead to greater
disclosure of pertinent information for
investors. As various companies provide
information consistent with one
accounting standard, the market will
demand similar disclosures from others.
Disclosures made consistent with
another accounting standard will prompt
the demand for similar information from
all companies. For in a competitive
financial environment, companies often
need to raise money from outside
investors. Investors want to know where
they can most profitably put their
investment, and they must decide on the
basis of the available information.
Without enough information of suffi-
cient quality—without the information
they demand—they will not invest. 
We should note that a firm’s “investors”
must be understood broadly as all of its
stakeholders, not just equity holders.
Bondholders, too, want sufficient infor-
mation to know that the return they are
getting is worth the risk. If it is not, the
price falls, and the return is higher—
that is, the firm faces higher financing
costs (or even obtains fewer funds).
Likewise, suppliers, who supply trade
credit (trade payables were 15 percent
of corporate equities in 2001) or under-
take actions that place their interests at
risk, such as configuring dies for spe-
cific parts or otherwise creating durable,
nonredeployable assets (as Oliver
Williamson often emphasizes in his
book, The Economic Institutions of
Capitalism)—need assurances before
they invest their time and money in the
firm. Even some employees, knowing 
it takes time to learn the ropes and that
unemployment is a possibility, will 
want information about the viability of
the firm. 
How do we determine what information
the entire set of stakeholders might need
to make informed decisions? Who
should we expect to assemble it? Merely
enforcing current accounting rules may
not give us a true picture of the viability
and future profitability of the firm
because the rules may already be obso-
lete. It’s possible to do much more by
demanding greater transparency in the
information companies and their
accountants report. When stakeholders
know where information about a com-
pany comes from, how it was gathered,
and how it has been modified from its
raw state, they can judge not only the
company’s interpretation of the data,
they can reassemble the data to suit their
own unique or evolving needs. 
An example might be taken from the
financial markets. It’s quite easy to find
the current level of the S&P 500 or even
the price of an individual stock. Financial
markets have moved to real-time access.
Information technology has made this
possible, and the customers desired it (see
Robert K. Elliot’s paper, “Do We Need a
New Accounting Model?”). Something
similar will happen in accounting. In the
future, it won’t matter if you count
employee stock options as an expense or
not. In fact, the company may not even
report “earnings” as conventionally
defined. Those stock options will be
reported and disclosed, however, and
markets will incorporate the information
into the company’s stock price and the
borrowing terms it faces. Another sticky
problem—how to account for 
customer acquisition costs (such as
advertising and marketing)—might yield
to the same treatment. Currently, this 
cost is treated as an investment if the 
customers stay with the company for a
year, or as an expense if they do not. 
So you can’t tell if your ad campaign this
June is truly an investment until next
June—well after you’ve closed the books
at the end of the year. You only know the
right answer when it is too late. Properly
disclosed, the cost of acquiring new cus-
tomers will be evaluated by the market,
not the company’s accountants, and the
market will judge what the cost means
for stock prices. And it may not give the
same answer for every firm—the best
approach for a virtual company may not
be the best for an aging steel company.
This is not to say that reports of “earn-
ings” will completely disappear. Infor-
mation intermediaries will arise to
aggregate and analyze the information
disclosed by firms. Some will involve
human judgment and input, while oth-
ers will be pure spreadsheet aggrega-
tions, and still others will use artificial
intelligence. These will compete with
one another in timeliness, accuracy, and 
analytic ability. Investors, with scarce
time and analytical ability, may then
look at summary statistics, which might
be some descendant of EBITDA (earn-
ings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization).
Greater transparency may even spread
to more basic practices of corporate
governance. Often the board of direc-
tors of a mutual fund hires senior man-
agement on a term-contract basis. Now,
a steel or software company is not a
mutual fund, but to the extent that
information becomes readily and
speedily available, when transparent
disclosure in real time replicates at least
one aspect of those funds, companies
may then converge in other dimensions.
That is, all senior management, not just
the CEO, would then be more clearly
dependent on the board of directors for
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The true future of corporate governance
and accounting reform is not something
that should be imposed by regulators or
blue-ribbon commissions. Given the vari-
ety of corporate forms we see—holding
companies, M-form corporations, part-
nerships, worker-owned cooperatives—
this should come as no surprise. It does
not mean governments should play no
role, however. Rather, their role should
be to establish an environment conducive
to effective and efficient financial mar-
kets. This may include establishing the
rules of the game, defining and enforcing
property rights, and setting up the basic
infrastructure that allows the market to
work. Even information-sharing activi-
ties—educating others about best prac-
tices encountered in financial exams—
are legitimate. But the temptation to 
correct alleged market mistakes by
imposing accounting standards, restrict-
ing the market for corporate control, or
removing financial discipline in the name
of safety move beyond the appropriate
functions of government.
Reforms in the financial markets related
to the rules of corporate governance,
accounting and auditing principles, and
matters regarding disclosures and trans-
parency, all must be developed within the
markets themselves rather than imposed
upon the markets by an outside entity. 
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